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Abstract
Thomas Aquinas nearly succeeds in addressing the persistent problem of the
mind-body relationship by redefining the human being as a body-soul (matter-form)
composite. This redefinition makes the interaction problem of substance dualism
inapplicable, because there is no soul “in” a body. However, he works around the mindbody problem only by sacrificing an immaterial afterlife, as well as the identity and
separability of the soul after death. Additionally, Thomistic psychology has difficulty
accounting for the transmission of universals, nor does it seem able to overcome the
arguments for causal closure.
Thomas constructs his distinct philosophy of the soul by interpreting Aristotelian
concepts in light of Catholic doctrine. His epistemology and psychology elucidate the
relationship of the soul to the body. He maintains that the soul is the form of the body,
the bridge between the corporeal and incorporeal worlds, and the first act of the body.
This thesis explains Aquinas's concept of the nature of the soul, especially how it allows
for the interaction of the intellectual soul with the body, and describes the influence of
religious doctrine on his viewpoint about the afterlife and resurrection.
Elucidation of the philosopher’s psychology demonstrates that, in concluding that
the soul is the form of the body, Aquinas eliminates the possibility of an immaterial
afterlife. The effect of this sacrifice is a difficulty in clearly explaining how an
immaterial form, the soul, continues to exist without a material body. Additionally,
Thomas’s philosophy of the soul cannot account for causal closure, which entails that all
physical effects must have sufficient physical causes.
This work provides a new angle on the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas by
focusing on the nexus of his philosophy of mind and his account of the afterlife. The
reconstruction of his view of the resurrection, as informed by his psychology, presents a
new interpretation of the philosopher, shining fresh light on how these accounts inform
one another. Additionally, this composition’s criticisms of Thomas afford a new outlook
to Thomistic philosophy, challenging his explanation of how humans complete universal
thought in light of contemporary understanding of the physical world.

I.

Introduction
Thomas Aquinas constructs his distinct philosophy of the soul by interpreting

Aristotelian concepts in light of Catholic doctrine. The philosopher gives special
attention to those teachings regarding the afterlife and resurrection. This paper contends
that Aquinas nearly succeeds in addressing the persistent problem of the mind-body
relationship by redefining the human being as a body-soul (matter-form) composite. This
move makes the mind-body interaction problem of substance dualism inapplicable
because there is no soul “in” a body, as Avicenna suggests.
For Avicenna, the human being is a soul,1 which uses the human body as a tool in
order to acquire the primary elements of knowledge.2 His substance dualism describes
the soul as an immaterial substance that is independent of the body, but which uses the
body to gain access to knowledge via sense perception.3 In this scenario, the soul is
“captain” of her bodily “ship.” Substance dualism has several problems, not least of
which is explaining how the two substances causally interact.
The following explains Aquinas's concept of the nature of the soul, especially
how it allows for the interaction of the intellectual soul with the body, and describes the
influence of religious doctrine on his viewpoint about the afterlife and resurrection. I
consider how the thinker addresses the problem of mind-body interaction, and argue that
Aquinas’s account manages to reconsider the relationship of soul to body outside the
typical mind-body connection. He reframes the issue by redefining the human being as a
composite, which makes the substance dualist’s problem of mind-body interaction
1
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3
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92.
2

1

inapplicable. By defining the human being as a body-soul (matter-form) composite,
Thomas eliminates the idea of a soul “in” a body.
Despite the creative workaround, Aquinas escapes the mind-body problem only
by sacrificing an immaterial afterlife; this creates the problem of the identity and
separability of the soul after death. The effect of this sacrifice is a difficulty in clearly
explaining how an immaterial form (in this case, the intellectual soul) continues to exist
without a material body. Indeed, his afterlife requires a bodily resurrection. Additionally,
Thomistic psychology has difficulty accounting for the transmission of universals from
material objects to the incorporeal intellect.
Finally, Thomas’s philosophy of the soul cannot account for causal closure, the
idea that “If a physical event has a cause that occurs at t, it has a physical cause occurring
at t,” a stronger version of which would state that “no event has a physical cause outside
the physical domain.”4 The implication of this is that Aquinas would have to accept that
either mental events have no causal power, or that mental events are in fact physical
events (or argue against causal closure). Since the philosopher believes that the
incorporeal soul is the act of the body, he would reject either of these conclusions.
This work provides a new angle on the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas by
focusing on the nexus of his philosophy of mind and his account of the afterlife. The
reconstruction of his view on the Christian resurrection, as informed by his Aristotelianinfluenced, but natural philosophy-heavy psychology, presents a new interpretation of the

4
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philosopher, shining fresh light on how these accounts inform one another. Additionally,
this composition’s criticisms of Thomas Aquinas afford a new outlook to Thomistic
philosophy, challenging his explanation of how humans complete abstract and universal
thought in light of contemporary understanding of the physical world.
My research contributes to the work of Gyula Klima, who describes Thomistic
psychology and its implications for the afterlife, particularly resurrection.5 I describe the
fundamental nature of Aquinas’s epistemology for his philosophy of mind, and explicate
the consequences for the philosopher’s reliance on divine illumination for the recognition
of universals. The failure of this essential element reverberates throughout Thomistic
philosophy, affecting especially that which Klima defends: Thomas’s solution for the
interaction problem of substance dualism.

II.

Aquinas’s Description of the Soul-body Relationship

II. A. Definition of the Soul
This section explains Aquinas’s definition of the human soul. In its three parts, I
account for Thomas’s description of the soul as a matter-form composite and as the first
act of the body. As well, I explain how the dual nature of human beings allows for this
type of soul in addition to making the human afterlife possible.

5
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II. A. 1. Human Being as Matter-Form Composite
The terms “soul,” “human soul,” “intellectual soul,” and “rational soul” are used
interchangeably in this paper, and refer to Thomas Aquinas’s definition (that is, the soul
is the form of the human being), which roughly correlates to the Aristotelian notion of
rational soul (and does not postulate any separate soul with nutritive or vegetative
powers, but encompasses these powers).
Thomas Aquinas believes the human soul is the form of the human being, which
is a matter-form composite. For him, form is the “intrinsic constitutive element of the
species…in sensible entities.”6 Matter in general is the “stuff” of which creation is made.
Prime matter is “the element of indetermination in corporeal beings.” It is the potential
by which the actuating form makes a thing what it is. Prime matter does not, and cannot,
exist on its own, because it has no accidental qualities such as quantity, nor is it a
substance which makes a thing itself; it must be created informed by a form.7
Substantial form, that type of form which he ascribes to the human soul, is that
“which determines or actuates materia prima to a specific substantial nature or essence.”8
As substantial form, the soul is a part of a substance, but it is not a substance itself. The
soul may exist separately from the body, and continue, after its death, in many of the
capacities we think of as human. Substantial form is “that in virtue of which the material
object is a member of the species to which it belongs,” and the structure or configuration
6
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that provides the object with the abilities that make the object what it is. For humans,
those abilities are those of the rational animal.
To explain, Aquinas maintains that a human being is a single material substance.
The philosopher understands the rational soul as the first principle of life9 and as the
substantial form of the body, which makes a human being their composite. “…[A human
being] is said to be from soul and body as a third thing constituted from two things
neither of which he is, for a [human] is not soul nor is he body.”10 This indicates that one
body plus one soul equals a third, original material: the human being, which has a dual
nature. In his words, “In complex substances there are form and matter, as in [humans]
there are soul and body…the existence of the compound substance is not of form alone
nor of matter alone but of the composed thing itself…”11 This indicates that while a
human is a single material substance, it still should be understood as having an
immaterial soul, which continues after bodily death. Clearly, these two statements are
difficult to reconcile.
Ultimately, humans are animals; the animal genus is body; body is material
substance. When embodied, a human person is an “individual substance in the category
rational animal.”12 The body thus belongs to the essence of a human being. This
accounts for the material aspect of human nature. While the human soul must necessarily
9

Kretzmann, Norman. “Philosophy of Mind.” Norman Kretzmann and Eleanor Stump, eds. The
Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 128.
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Aquinas. London: Penguin, 1998. p. 36.
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Niederberger and Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), (Frankfurt-London: OntosVerlag, 2006), p. 166.
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be incorporeal, humans are also natural, which entails being at least partly matter. Thus,
it is in the nature of a human to be soul and matter because sensation requires the body,
but the senses also provide access to knowledge through perception. Because humans are
composite beings, their essence is of matter and form.
Essence is “that through which and in which the thing has existence.”13 As
humans exist in both, so their essence is through both. Because of this, that the body (the
physicality of human existence) “is an integral…part of animal and soul is not included in
its meaning but supervenes on it and from the two, body and soul, the animal is
constituted as from its parts.”14 The soul as the body’s form can be understood when one
compares Aquinas’ definition of matter (that which of itself exists incompletely), with his
definition of form (that which gives existence to matter). An item is matter if it is
changeable and can become different than it is; that is, matter is always potentially
something else and exists incompletely. For example, bronze matter is potentially a
statue, or also potentially a cymbal. When Aquinas says the body is of matter, it means
the material body is only potentially a human being without the intellectual soul. Matter
must be understood as the matter of something.
Alternately, the form of a thing is that whose enmattered presence is that matter’s
being that very thing. For matter to be the thing, some form of the thing must be present
in it. Consequently, what it is for human matter to be living human tissue simply consists
in a human soul’s being wholly present in each part of the human. The human soul, the

13
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body’s form, is that which makes a thing’s matter to be actually what it would have been
or had been merely potentially.
Brian Leftow proposes a helpful analogy. He maintains that one can think of the
soul, metaphorically, as a free radical. A free radical is a combination of elements that
acts as a single unit in chemical reactions, but which is not bound into any larger
molecule. Unstable free radicals have an available place in their structure which another
atom or molecule can fill, creating a compound. Unstable radicals are prone to form a
molecule of a compound, becoming a stable molecule. The radical persists as an
undetached part of the resulting molecule—the structuring part. God creates a stable
molecule (human being) and death detaches a part that leaves an unstable radical.
Resurrection returns that part, forming the molecule as before.15 This exemplifies the
composite nature of the human being.

II. A. 2. Soul as First Act of the Body
Thomas Aquinas takes this definition of the soul as matter-form composite further
by detailing that substantial form is the act of the body; it is the principle of activity and
provides existence for those things of which it is the essence.16 Aquinas defines the soul
as “the first principle of life of those things which live,” and the object of inquiry in this

15
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paper is the human (rational or intellectual) soul, which is the incorporeal and subsistent
“principle of intellectual operation.”17
Because the soul is the first principle of life, it is the intrinsic source and
explanation for all vital activities, up to and including existence itself.18 Some of the vital
activities for which the soul is the source include perception, especially visual perception,
a life activity. However the soul allows for visual perception, it is obvious that the eye
itself (the organ of visual perception) is not the soul. Neither is any organ the soul; the
soul itself is not corporeal.19
Bodies themselves are not necessarily alive, so no body (or organ) itself can have
life essentially. But, a first intrinsic principle of life, which by its nature imbues other
things with life, necessarily has life essentially. So, a soul, which is a first principle of
life, cannot be a body (or organ).20 Indeed, because the intellect is incorporeal, it does
not even use a bodily organ for its own proper act, as “the operation of anything follows
the mode of its being.”21 That is, a corporeal body is not necessary for the fulfillment of
an incorporeal action.
Things are alive by means of their being organized in a way that has the potential
for life; this organization is the result of a body’s form. So, the first principle of life in a
body is its form, the form of the matter-form composite of every human body. Thus, the
soul is the function of a body or the effect of the body’s “configuration of physical
17

Aquinas. Summa Theologiae. Part I, Question 75.
Kretzmann. p. 129.
19
Ibid., p. 131.
20
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components.”22 A person is matter embodied by the intellectual soul. The human soul,
intellect, is realized by the physical body. The soul does not “cause” the body to act;
instead, the soul is part of a whole being, which is capable of action due to its
organization. Form is matter’s act, its intended objective, its being-what-it-is,23 much the
way that a pyramid’s shape makes it a pyramid.24
Form’s being described as matter’s act indicates that, as Thomas says, “To seek
the nature of the soul, we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle
of life of those things which live…Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life,
is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of calefaction, is not
a body, but an act of a body.”25 That is, form is that which makes a thing what it is.
Humans live by virtue of their souls; the human form is the structure, or structuring force,
of the body.
Form can be described as structure by comparing the soul’s structuring form to
that of a molecule. What makes a DNA molecule a molecule of deoxyribonucleic acid,
rather than any other kind, is its structure. This example also retains the concept of form
as agent, however; as the structure of a DNA molecule causes the synthesis of proteins,
so does the structure of the soul cause the vital act of body (understanding).26 Form as
body’s being-what-it-is means that the “form, through itself, makes a thing to

22
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be actual since it is itself essentially an act; nor does it give existence by means of
something else.”27 Form gives existence, or being, to that matter it structures.

II. A. 3. Human Dual Nature
For Aquinas, all things are either corporeal or incorporeal, except human beings.
The human soul accounts for the “peculiar character” of humans, who bridge the two
types of substance. It is the very nature of human beings to link these two worlds; thus,
only living, form-matter composites can truly be called human; dead bodies are “human”
only analogously or equivocally. 28 When the soul leaves the body, the remaining corpse
is human-shaped lump of matter, probably prime matter.
The benefit provided by the soul’s substantial nature is that it allows for
immortality by permitting the soul to survive bodily death. However, this makeup of the
soul also threatens the unity of the human being because the “rational animal” appears to
have two natures: the corporeal, animal nature and the incorporeal intellect. Not only do
these natures seem incompatible,29 this philosophy also veers dangerously close to a
Platonic conception of the soul (wherein the soul is the essence of a person, and simply
takes on and discards the body like clothing), which Thomas rejects.
Platonic philosophy identifies the human with the soul, and maintains that the
soul simply uses the body, being related to it accidentally. Aquinas rejects accidental
relation of the body to the soul, because the soul is embodied for its benefit, in order to
27

Aquinas. Summa Theologiae. Question 76, Article 7.
Ibid., Article 8.
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complete the essential human activity of understanding. Therefore, he maintains the
intellectual soul is united to the body substantially. That is, the soul is the actuality to
matter’s potentiality.30
Because of Aquinas’s conception of the soul as form, the typical mind-body
problem is inapplicable; there is no “interaction” between the mind and the body in the
way Avicenna articulated the problem. The soul does not drive the body; instead, the
soul structures the body something like software that determines both the organization of
the body and its encoded action, or behavior. That is, the causal relationship between the
soul and the body is not like a captain and her ship,31 but the form could be said to have
causal influence in that the composite (form-matter) has configuring power, as intellect
(activity) is implemented in the body (potentiality) and since knowledge takes place, at
least at some level, via the senses.32 This affirmation highlights Aquinas’s dedication to a
non-Platonic or even anti-Platonic notion of the soul.
Though the human soul does not depend on the body, it is perfected in the body.
Part of its nature is spiritual, as the corporeal is for the benefit of the incorporeal. The
body-soul composite is of matter and soul, however, so it differs from typical material
forms, which are only found in matter (and thus depend on matter). This is the result of
the dual nature of humanity, which bridges the spiritual and material worlds by means of
its intellect and its animality.
30

Aquinas. Summa Theologiae. Question 76, Article 6.
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32
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In sum, the soul is stated to be both an abstract (meaning conceptual, universal,
and essential, without material accidents) form (an act of body) and a concrete particular
thing, which seems contradictory, but Aquinas accepts that the soul is a thing and a state,
an abstract form and a live thing.33 As a state and a thing, the soul is able to outlast its
body. For Aquinas, all states are particulars individuated by their bearers, but at least one
state (that of human organization) can float free of its bearer. The consequence of this,
for Thomas’s philosophy regarding the afterlife, is obvious: the soul can disconnect from
the body after its death and remain in an altered, but substantial, state until the
resurrection of that body.

II. B. Knowledge, Perception, and the Problem of Universals
II. B. 1. The Corporeal Nature of the Body and the Incorporeal Nature of the Soul
Despite its spiritual nature, the intellectual soul is the lowest intellectual
substance, compared to other intellectual substances, such as the angels and God. As
“the act of a physical organic body having life potentially,” it must use the senses to gain
knowledge. That is, the senses require the “corporeal instrument” of the body, to which
that individual soul is united.34
A human being is a material thing inasmuch as material things are composed of
form and matter. Take a sample of water as an example; water is one material thing.

33
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Water’s form is a state, an abstract thing. The existence of water “just is a water-form
being wholly present at each point in a parcel of matter.”35 The implication of this for
human beings is that a human just is the human form (soul) wholly present at each point
in a parcel of matter (body). For Aquinas, the subject of perception is the whole animal,
not any subsystem. For Aquinas, higher rational processes have no bodily organ. Yet,
understanding Aquinas’s account of perception is necessary to comprehend his account
of the soul, as the soul and body interrelate upon the human’s own proper act of
understanding universals.
Like Aristotle, Thomas describes cognition as requiring the knowing becoming
like the thing known. This means that immaterial things can only be understood by
means of an immaterial process; likewise, material objects require being sensed by
material bodies. Because the soul, or intellect, is immaterial, humans are capable of
cognizing the natures of all bodies (recognizing universals). Yet, such ability is not part
of the body’s own nature, because it is corporeal, and universals are incorporeal. If the
intellective principle were in the nature of the corporeal body itself, then that principle
would not be able to recognize the natures of all bodies.
That is, Aquinas rejects the idea that the human is only the soul, because he
believes sensation is necessary for human experience. For this reason, he insists that the
body and the soul are essential. Despite human animal nature, the soul is not matter, not
even incorporeal or spiritual matter. If the intellectual soul were matter, it would not be
able to understand immaterial universals, which is necessary for the more important,
35
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spiritual, nature of the human being. Aquinas accepts that “whatever is received is
received according to the mode of the receiver.”36 If this is the case, then in order for the
soul (receiver) to understand (receive) immaterial universals, it must have the same
nature as the universal. As such, a material soul necessarily would entail that forms are
only received and understood by the soul individually, disallowing any knowledge of
universals. The soul is immaterial not simply because it is form, but also because of its
having operations (the vital activities of the agent intellect) which are independent of
matter.
Obviously, though, our intellect does have cognition of itself (as is apparent in
self-reflection) and the use of universals, so the intellective principle cannot be found in
the nature of the body itself. Because it is capable of recognizing bodies, therefore, it can
neither be a body nor use a body. Thus, anything we know about bodies, we gain through
use of our senses. Thus, intellect depends upon the senses for data, but does not process
that data by use of a corporeal body or organ.37
Because the human soul is not material, it must be incorporeal. Intellective
cognition, a vital activity which is performed by the soul without use of the body,
distinguishes the human from other types of souls. Since intellective activity is not
performed with a body, then the body is not necessary for the first act of the human.
Indeed, the soul is the “principle of intellective activity.”38 The soul, identified with the
rational nature and essential function of the human being, could not be considered the
36
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first intrinsic principle of a corporeal creature’s vital activities if it were identified with a
corporeal body. As the principle of intellective activity (which is not only incorporeal
but does not use any corporeal organ), the human soul is capable of subsisting on its own
and must be a substance in its own right.39 Therefore, the human rational soul is
necessarily an incorporeal substance capable of surviving the death of the human body.
So, the subsistence of the human soul is due to its being essentially incorporeal, which is
the result of its being “the vital activity of intellective cognition,” which is an activity in
which the body does not share.40

II. B. 2. Knowledge and Perception
Humans are rational animals, in that reason is more suited to humans than
sensation. Humans use the senses for life, but also in order to acquire cognition, a
purpose for which they were designed by God. Aquinas’s benevolent God designed
humans in the best possible way for the purpose of gaining knowledge. The human soul,
as a single substantial form providing the potential for rational thought, makes humans
“in God’s image.” Because cognition depends on the senses, sense perception’s purpose
is to serve the intellect. The proper activity for a human is thinking and understanding,
and humans even have a natural desire for knowledge. The cognitive faculties are
organized to satisfy that desire, and God has ensured human access to knowledge.41

39
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Thomas agrees with Aristotle that “to think is to speculate with images.”42
Furthermore, he maintains that the human understands via the soul. Mental states require
the brain and body, because this is where and how our sense faculties encode and realize
experience, which is the ultimate source of human knowledge. (While the soul may exist
separated from the body, during this divided state, it cannot do all the things humans do.
Because the human soul is the constitutive element of the nature of a human substance,
when it is detached from the human body, it is incomplete. Thus, a soul with no body is
“unnatural,” because it is divorced from the potential for sensation, the basis for thought.)
Differences in body do affect intellectual understanding, because change in matter affects
the way matter realizes its substantial form.
Intellectual thoughts are based on brain “phantasms,” which are “physically
encoded and realized ‘images’,”43 and can be understood simply as “forms existing in
matter.”44 The realizings of phantasms are the medium in which embodied thinking takes
place. So, intellectual operations have neural correlates. Thomas insists on braingenerated phantasms, but this is not a one-one correlation. That is, Aquinas still insists
the intellect has no organ, and focuses his conception of the nature of the soul on this
fact. This lack is central for Aquinas, for it allows for the soul’s continued existence after
the death of the body. Because intellect is not identified with a function of the brain, it is
capable of maintaining some vital activities even without the body.

42
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Thomas Aquinas’s account of knowledge tracks sense data from its source in the
corporeal to the incorporeal intellect. When a sense organ senses, it is affected by a
sense-perceptible thing, and the sense organ becomes actually as the sense-perceptible
thing is. That is, corporeal things make physical impressions on the corporeal organs of
the “external senses.” The internal sense impressions are transmitted to the internal
senses which store and process them. Internal sense, or “phantasia,” produces and
preserves sense data, or phantasms, for the use of the intellect. There are two powers in
the intellect, the agent and the possible intellects. The agent intellect acts upon
phantasms to produce “intelligible species,” the primary contents of the mind. The
possible intellect stores those intelligible species. This process allows human
understanding of universals by virtue of the soul’s being the form of some matter.
To explain, the soul has two powers. First, by the action of corporeal organs, the
soul understands things as they exist in individual matter, gained by the senses through
their cognition (only) of individual objects. Second, the intellect cognizes the natures of
things, which exist in material individuals or the intellect, gained from those individual
objects. Humans cognize these material natures as they are abstracted from individual
matter. Thus, human intellect gets from an individual material thing by use of the senses,
to the nature of a thing by use of the active intellect, which is beyond the capacities of the
senses.45
Intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses (on the part of phantasms), but the
phantasms alone are not enough; they require being made actually intelligible to the
45
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intellectual soul. (The soul requires the phantasms for knowledge while enmattered.)
The phantasm is the door or mirror by which the spiritual and the physical worlds are
capable of interaction, with the result of human knowledge of universals.46 Employment
of universal concepts requires the human soul; this is the difference between the human
and animal souls.

II. B. 3. Implications of Knowledge and Sense Perception to Thomas’s Account of the
Soul
Aquinas preserves the unique nature of the human soul by insisting on its
difference in kind from that of an animal. The difference is found in the mind’s content.
He bridges the angelic with the animal worlds by asserting that humans are able to access
the nature of material things (quiddities) within material particulars by use of the agent
intellect, as divine beings do directly. This bridge is the agent intellect. The agent
intellect, which is active and creative, converts the corporeal into the incorporeal, as well
as the particular into the universal (by the same operation). In this way, it abstracts
intelligible species (which are like itself in nature).47 However, Thomas cannot account
for how this creation and conversion actually takes place; he must rely on innate divine
illumination.
Divine illumination, in concert with the senses, allows humans to recognize the
eternal, immaterial natures of changing, material objects, and provides humans with the
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capacity to recognize self-evident truths. Aquinas relies on God to solve the mystery of
human cognition,48 stating:
And so, in a way, all knowledge is imparted to us at the start, in the light
of agent intellect [a faculty of the human soul], mediated by the universal
concepts that are cognized at once by the light of agent intellect. Through
these concepts, as through universal principles, we make judgments about
other things, and in these universal concepts we have a prior cognition of
those others. In this connection there is truth in the view that the things we
learn, we already had knowledge of.49
The philosopher acknowledges that mental states require brains and bodies to “encode”
sense perceptions and the realizations of sense experience. Thus, Thomas agrees that
differences in the brain influence the intellect, because differences in matter are reflected
in that matter’s substantial form. Intellectual thoughts are based in phantasms produced
by the brain in correlation to the sense organs, but however those phantasms are
physically encoded, this correlation does not entail that reason has an organ (or that a
malfunction in the body reflects a fault in the soul), simply because this type of thought
requires divine intellect. (Divine intellect is put into the soul by God at the creation of a
human being, and so is not required to be ongoing.) That is, Thomas must admit that
“every intellectual substance possesses intellective power by the Influence of the Divine
Light.”50 When the soul separates from the body at death, it understands in this way, “by
means of species received from the influence of the Divine Light.” Such knowledge is
not perfect (as the separated soul cannot turn to the phantasms for understanding and is in
48
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an unnatural state), but is confused. 51 However, it does not cease to function completely,
because a soul’s existence entails its functioning.52
The best knowledge (clear understanding of abstract concepts, the recognition of
universals) takes place by the soul when it is enmattered, with the realizings of
phantasms. Phantasms are generated by the brain, and so intellectual operations have a
correlate, but this correlation is not one to one but many to one. That is, thought content
can differ despite the same sense experience. Different thoughts can be brought about by
the same sense perception. Because of this difference, it is clear that not all thought is
physically encoded in the phantasms; there must be something else (the agent intellect)
which allows for the highly abstracted nature of the universal.
For example, on two occasions one may receive the same sense impression (such
as “dark motion”) and on one occasion receive the intelligible “live mouse” while on the
other “moving shadow.” Such a difference is amplified when one considers the
experiences of multiple subjects; it is intuitive that while we may experience identical
sense data, something happens between the “external world” and its perceptions and
rational thought, and obviously our “higher” (rational) intellectual activities differ
greatly. Thus it is clear that the brain, as physical organ, is involved in knowledge in
general, but not in abstract and universal thinking, with the perception of universals,
which is completed by the rational soul.53
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The implications of Aquinas’s epistemology for his theory of the soul are
obvious. His theory of knowledge explicates the relationship between the soul and body
without the problems associated with the Platonic mind-body connection, and makes
possible the sort of afterlife required by the Catholic Christian tradition. However, this
same opportunity is where Thomas’s argument for the knowledge of universals breaks
down: he cannot account for knowledge without divine assistance, which does not allow
for a naturalistic explanation of human rational insight, instead relying on supernatural
intervention. Because he defines the soul as the form of the body, and because he
maintains that the human being is a soul-matter composite, he is still a dualist of sorts and
cannot bridge the gap between the corporeal and the incorporeal worlds naturally.

III. Afterlife
III. A. How Aquinas’s Soul Allows for the Afterlife
The human soul is a substance, so it may exist after the death of the body.
Without a body, however, the soul is incapable of expressing normal human action. This
requires that the afterlife take place within a resurrected body. Yet, the concept of
resurrection presents some problems for Aquinas.
First, he has difficulty accounting for the individuation of the soul. The thisness
(quiddity, haecceity) of an object is the object’s having the form which configures it in
this way. That is, the human’s substantial form makes the human person who and what
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she is, by configuring prime matter, “that which is in potency to substantial existence,”54
in the configuration that is, for example, Krista. Krista is distinguished from another
human being by the matter, which underlies the configuration. After Krista’s death, her
intellectual memories (memories of universals), intellectual abilities, and will are
continuous with those she had during her life.55 However, Aquinas believes a human
being is not simply the sum of its body and soul parts. That is, though a soul as part of a
person is sufficient for a person (and can exist on its own), it is not identical to the
person. The substantial form of a human being is not a human being, but is sufficient for
the existence of a human being.56
The constituents of a normal person are soul and body; however, humans continue
to exist in unnatural, abnormal states, such as in death, with the absence of body. A
human being is not identical to the substantial form, but is “identical to a substance in the
species of rational animal,” which is normally the composite but can sometimes be
constituted by one of its metaphysical components. Stump maintains, “[A]lthough a
person is not identical to [a person’s] soul, the existence of the soul is sufficient for the
existence of a person.”57

54

Aquinas, Thomas. The Principles of Nature. (De principiis naturae.) Translated by R. A. Kocourek in
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature. St. Paul: North Central Publishing, 1948. Joseph Kenny,
O.P., html ed. <http://www.dhspriory.org/thomas>
55
Aquinas. Summa Theologiae. Question 79, Article 6.
56
Stump, Eleanore. “Resurrection, Reassembly, and Reconstitution: Aquinas on the Soul,” in Die
menschliche Seele: Brauchen wir den Dualismus? The Human Soul: Do We Need Dualism?. “…although
the metaphysical constituents of a human being normally include matter and a substantial form, Aquinas
thinks that a human being can exist without being in the normal condition in this way, because what
constitutes a human being is not the same as that to which a human being is identical.” p. 167.
57
Ibid., p. 167-8.

22

A human being is made this particular individual by virtue of its being a
configured form in relation to this very matter.58 The soul is the one substantial form that
makes this matter the human being Krista. The soul, as the form of the body, is a
substance that is not caused from its individual parts.59,60 In this way, the soul is not
reducible to the material body. “[T]he soul makes matter be not just human, but also this
human being…this particular individual.”61 So, the Thomistic soul begins as a state of
the human being but persists after the person’s demise.

III. B. Catholic Doctrine on the Soul and Resurrection
According to Catholic doctrine, as stated by Aquinas and in the Catechism of the
Catholic Church, the soul is real and distinct from the body. Its incorporeal nature is
required for its survival of the death of the body, and necessitated by the nature of the
afterlife. The soul is the principle allowing for vital activities, so it is responsible for both
nutritive and vegetative qualities as well as for consciousness. Capable of “subsisting in
itself,” it is thus neither corporeal nor dependent upon the body.62 The “spiritual soul,”
according to the Church, is created immediately by God and is immortal, as it does not
perish when the body does, and remains, suspended, until bodily resurrection.63 By
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resurrection of the body, Catholic doctrine means the resurrection of actual human flesh,
as we know it now (weak and mortal); however, when resurrected, the body will be
changed.64
Here, Thomas’s philosophy on the soul and its relationship becomes an article of
faith; he can be understood as having set Catholic doctrine, as the Council of Vienne of
1311 defines the rational soul as the form of the body.65 This entails that the soul is
substance, but one which is incomplete without the body, since it has a “natural aptitude
and exigency for existence in the body, in conjunction with which it makes up the
substantial unity of human nature.” Therefore, it is the natural state of the soul to be in
relation to the body, though its “higher operations” are independent of bodily organ, so
the soul is not “wholly immersed in nature,” according to the Church. This final
statement is not in agreement with Thomistic philosophy, but is the result of Platonic
influences of Aquinas’s contemporaries.66 Relatedly, according to the 4th Lateran
Council (in 1215), all humans “will rise again with their own bodies which they now bear
about with them.”67 Only the body must be resurrected, because the soul cannot die. The
resurrection of the body takes place at the end of the world, when all the bodies of every
previously living person rise from the earth and are reunited with their respective souls,
in order to share in their fate at Judgment. Then, bodies and souls will never again be
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separated.68 Our definitive state, as humans, is as body-soul composite. This state is
disrupted by death, but rectified upon resurrection. Death is simply the separation of the
body from the soul, and after death the body disintegrates but the soul waits for judgment
and resurrection.69
The resurrection of the body is an article of faith based on Hebrew and Christian
scripture, as well as on Christian tradition. Scripture speaks clearly on this issue, and of
course, Thomas must fall in line with scripture. For example, in Job, it is stated “I know
that my redeemer lives, and that in the end [God] will stand on the earth. And after my
skin has been destroyed, yet in my flesh I will see God; I myself will see [God] with my
own eyes—I, and not another…”70 This entails that everyone will thus rise with their
entire bodies, and these bodies will be our very own bodies; the ones we had in life. Our
bodies will be perfectly restored, not as they were originally, but having spiritual natures.
Additionally, the Gospel of John instructs, “Do not be amazed by this, for a time
is coming when all who are in their graves will hear [God’s] voice and come out—those
who have done what is good will rise to live, and those who have done what is evil will
rise to be condemned.”71 Clearly, resurrection is ingrained within the scripture of
Christianity.
Christian tradition makes faith in the resurrection a requirement of all believers,
according to the Catechism of the Catholic Church. As stated by St. Augustine, “no
68
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Christian should have the slightest doubt as to the fact that the bodies of all men, whether
already or yet to be born, whether dead or still to die, will be resurrected.”72
Athenagoras, a “Father of the Church” and a scholar living in the second century,73 states
even more clearly that any concerns regarding how the resurrection takes place should be
laid aside, as God’s “power is sufficient for the raising of dead bodies…[God] will, when
they are dissolved, in whatever manner that may take place, raise them again with equal
ease [as their creation].”74 While the resurrection is an article of faith, it is also rationally
congruous within Aquinas’s view, because the soul has a natural propensity for the body,
and so their perpetual separation would be unnatural. Furthermore, because the body and
soul together were good or evil during life, they must be judged and rewarded, or
punished, together at Judgment. Finally, since their separation leads to imperfection,
their unity in the afterlife leads to the soul’s consummation of happiness for the good.
However, the resurrection would be unnecessary without the fall; “in a state of pure
nature” no resurrection would be required.75
In conclusion, Thomas’s account of the soul fits well with Catholic doctrine
because if the soul is not the form of the body, and is independent but making use of the
body, then this opens the possibility for the pre-existence of souls, (as there would simply
be no reason for God to wait until conception to create the soul) which he adamantly
rejects. He refuses to accept such a possibility because of his deep conviction that the
72
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soul, as the form of the body, must be created with the body in its natural state, as God
creates things “as they are naturally complete,” and the soul is naturally complete when
united with the body.76

III. C. Resurrection
It might seem as if the soul would have to be a separate, independent substance in
order to survive the death of the body; if this is the case, then resurrection requires
substance dualism, which Thomas rejects. Yet, he believes the soul persists after the
death and corruption of the body, and is capable of existence, separated from the body
between the time of death and the resurrection. Aquinas believes in a different sort of
dualism, one guided by scripture. The philosopher knows that human beings are only
dust, but that the dust has a soul capable of returning to God after life.77
For him, the rewards and punishment of the afterlife are not only spiritual.
Resurrection is an important part of his philosophy on the soul. The human is fulfilled
and complete in the body, so the hereafter will take place with souls enmattered in
resurrected bodies. In addition to spiritual reward, humans will enjoy material and
physical blessings. Because Aquinas’s soul requires a body for its actions, the afterlife’s
soul will also be punished or rewarded in corporeal existence. This also has effects for
the individuation of the soul. Because individuals are held responsible for their earthly
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actions, the separated soul must be identical with a particular human being. Aquinas
accounts for this by explaining the soul as configured in relation to specific matter.
Aquinas states clearly his stance on resurrection, and uses it to back up his
philosophy of justice; that is, the promise of resurrection compensates Christians who
suffered in this world through a heavenly union with the divine. He says, “If there is no
resurrection of the dead, it follows that there is no good for human beings other than in
this life.”78 Resurrection provides the impetus for people to sacrifice pleasures in this
life. Thus, it seems essential that Thomas’s description of the soul’s relationship to the
body account for resurrection.
Aquinas believes the human who has prepared for the afterlife both morally and
intellectually will be rewarded more greatly; however, all reward is through the grace of
God. He also believes beatitude will be conferred according to merit, and will render the
person better able to conceive the divine. Aquinas accordingly believes punishment is
directly related to earthly, living preparation and activity as well.

IV. Weaknesses and Counter-arguments
IV. A. Interaction
Any substance which understands forms as universals must necessarily not be a
matter-form composite, like a human being. A human being is one actually existing,
single material substance (which is the body-soul composite), but it also has an
intellectual soul (which is the form of the body). While human souls are immaterial, they
78
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are nonetheless forms of the physical body. Aquinas says, “something one in nature can
be formed from an intellectual substance and a body,” and “a thing one in nature does not
result from two permanent entities unless one has the character of substantial form and
the other of matter.”79 That is, a single substance is created by the composite of matter
and form, which is allowed by the special relationship of matter to form (that of actual to
the potential). Therefore, the composite is not what understands the immaterial
universals, but the soul itself, alone. Humans (as composite beings) were made for
rational thought, but only the soul understands universals; this allows the human soul’s
operations that are independent of matter.
In this way, Aquinas reframes the mind-body connection and escapes the
interaction problem, but this opens him up to another, potentially fatal, flaw. The
weakness of his argument is that it is not clear how such a soul could separate from the
body and survive its death, despite his protestations that this act of the body is also
substantial. Aquinas maintains that the human soul is an abstract form and a concrete
particular thing. He has accounted for the soul as the form of the body. It is intuitive,
however, that such forms would have to be Platonic (that is, an incorporeal, abstract idea,
having the highest level of reality and to which humans have access only through the
world of perception and sensation) if they can be said to depart from the body and remain
in existence with some function until the time of the resurrection and judgment, as
required by Christian doctrine. Aquinas, of course, would never accept his philosophy as
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Platonic, especially on this account, because he insists that matter is for the edification of
the soul. Plato maintains that the soul simply “uses” matter, but that matter is
unnecessary.
If the soul is a state, it must be one that can exist apart from that which bears it.
Though the concept of the free radical is helpful as an illustration of the soul as form, it
fails to exemplify this aspect; the free radical is not immaterial. The soul as organizing
force of the body may be fatal to Aquinas’s psychology. If the soul is seen as a sort of
genetic code or as software to the body’s hardware, however, it may be possible to
imagine its survival in an immaterial state, to be employed (later, during the afterlife) in
organizing prime matter once more.
A counter-objection might suggest that the soul survives between death and
resurrection, but is "activated" again upon the resurrection. It does not seem likely that
Aquinas would be willing to accept that the soul is totally incapacitated until Judgment,
since he insists that the soul retains its proper operations: will, intellectual memory, and
understanding.

IV. B. Separation, Continuation, Individuation, Identity, and the Resurrection
This state of affairs, wherein the soul begins as a human state but persists after
death, presents a particularly difficult problem for Aquinas. Thomas insists that the
human soul can survive the death of the body; this much is essential for Catholic
doctrine. Yet, he also insists the human soul is substantial form and the proper function
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of the human being. Thus, he must account for the form of a material object’s continuing
to exist despite the cessation of that object’s existence.80
Thomas does not appear to appropriately answer the question of individuation.
The individuation of a disembodied soul is an historical problem within his own context
(unlike the problem of causal closure, which is contemporary), and was recognized
earlier by Boethius, who stated that things which are individuals are discrete only
numerically, and differ only accidentally.81 Aristotelians (like Thomas) believe we are
form-matter composites. Individuation of the soul, after the death of the body, must be
accounted for by one of the three types of substances: form, matter, or their composite.
According to this account, the only thing Aquinas can rely on for individuation is
the immaterial concept. This is because the composite, which is alive and individuated,
does not exist after the death of the body and before the resurrection, so individuation
cannot be ascribed to it. Individuation cannot be ascribed to the form itself, because
though humans are formally different than other animals, humans are not differentiated
by their forms because the human form is the form for the entire species. That is, all
humans have the form “human,” and once the soul is disembodied, there is no matter by
which it can be differentiated. Form individuates things formally differentiated, such as a
human from a dog. Things that are formally alike must be individuated by material, but
all human disembodied souls are immaterial, and so all human disembodied souls are
80
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formally alike: There is no differentiation of the incorporeal soul in this framework.
Individuation cannot be explained by Thomas’s own principles. Thus, Aquinas is left
without individuation of souls after their deaths, and it is not obvious how the individual
human souls can re-form their previous bodies, leaving Aquinas’s afterlife far different
than that elucidated in scripture.
Thus, it is unclear whether Thomas’s philosophy accounts for the identity of the
human person whose body is resurrected. He has not described how the soul maintains
its individual identity after death, through the bodiless time before resurrection. The
philosopher admits that parts come and go during earthly life, but maintains that identity
is carried by species, which includes form.82 The problem is that this does not entail
individual human souls, as the species (simply, “human”) is carried by the rational soul
(which belongs to the species in general). So, though the soul maintains continuity after
death, it does not necessarily entail individual continuity.
Aquinas attempts to account for the human soul’s separation from the body at
death by placing it firmly between the two worlds of material and immaterial forms.
Material forms cannot be separated from the body. The organization or structure of a
material object cannot be completely disconnected from the matter of that object.
Immaterial forms, on the other hand, are not enmattered; they can be considered
intellectual organization. Because the human is the link between these two extremes, the
human soul is capable of existing after the death of the body, but it loses many of its
functions, and cannot be considered a fully human being. Again, Aquinas insists that the
82
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soul can be separated from the body (as it is substance) but because this separation is
unnatural, some essential human functions (notably, the type of knowledge that requires
sense perception) are lost.

IV. C. Causal closure
Finally, Aquinas’s account of the human soul cannot conflicts with the causal
closure of the physical world. The difficulty of causal interaction, based in physics, is not
bridged by his description of knowledge; that is, the philosopher still maintains that there
are physical effects from incorporeal causes. In contemporary philosophy, physicalism,
the position that everything that exists is physical, maintains the thesis of the
completeness of physics, or, relatedly, causal closure. However, one need not accept
physicalism to grant causal closure, which simply states that nothing nonphysical can
have any physical effect, even within the bodies of conscious beings.83
Causal closure entails that “all physical effects are fully determined by law by
prior physical occurrences.”84 More definitively, the claim is that “every physical effect
has an immediate sufficient physical cause, in so far as it has a sufficient physical cause
at all.”85 Most clearly of all, “if you start with some physical effect, then you will never
have to leave the realm of the physical to find a fully sufficient cause for that effect. 86 If
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non-physical events cause physical events, then those events must be supervenient on
physical events.87
What evidence can be found for causal closure? It follows from the first law of
thermodynamics, but extensive, conclusive evidence for it did not emerge until the 1950s.
The conservation of energy is now considered one of the most basic, fundamental laws of
nature.88 However, the law was not fully established until mechanics described it
mathematically, the concept of a single underlying quantity (of changing form) was
proposed for different natural processes, and apparently non-conservative forces (even
physiological “vital forces”) were re-defined by more fundamental conservative forces.89
The conservation of energy is not inconsistent with sui generis deterministic forces, and
emergentists posited such forces until the mid-twentieth century. Since then, however,
detailed modern physiological research has virtually ruled out any “such anomalous
physical processes.”90 Biochemical and neurophysiological forces seem to describe the
entirety of cellular events.
Since the 1950s, there has been general scientific consensus on the completeness
of physics, and recognition that such a “vital force” would effectively break the first law
of thermodynamics, the law of conservation of energy.91 The Thomistic soul can, in this
context, be considered a vital force, as it is the vital function of the human being.
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However, conservation laws disallow the possibility of vital, mental (or “special”) forces.
Fundamentally, “special” forces previously considered outside the physical realm have
reduced to basic physical forces, and physiologically, organic processes fully described
by normal physical forces have accounted for “special” forces.92 The Thomistic soul can,
in this context, be considered a vital force, and this requires Thomas to either reconsider
his philosophy of mind, or question the first law of thermodynamics.
Causal closure poses obvious problems for substance dualism, because the
principle maintains that physical events do not have non-physical causes. This entails
that non-physical mental states cannot affect physical entities, and there is an
unbridgeable breach between the mind, or soul, and the brain. This worry may not apply
to Thomas’s account of the relationship between the soul and the body, given as he does
that the soul is itself a substantial entity even when detached from the body.
Indeed, it would seem that causal closure would not present a problem to
Thomistic dualism when one realizes that Thomas places the action of recognizing
universals within the capacity of the soul alone. This entails that the soul itself is being,
an unqualifiedly subsistent entity.93 However, when one realizes that Thomas has simply
pushed back the interaction problem of substance dualism from body and soul to brain
and intellect, it becomes clear that causal closure does pose a problem for his
metaphysics.
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With this in mind, it is not apparent that Thomistic psychology (as it relies on his
epistemology) is compatible causal closure. If things in the non-physical realm have
physical effects, according to this principle, it is because those causes supervene on
physical causes. That is, mental causes are not ontologically different than physical
causes,94 and mental states supervene on brain states. For Thomas, this would entail that
the workings of the soul simply are the workings of the brain. Accepting causal closure
and this explanation would commit him to accepting the soul as corporeal, which he
would obviously be unwilling to grant.
Furthermore, Thomas wants knowledge to bridge the corporeal and incorporeal
realms, but he seems unable to describe how it is that humans recognize universals, or
how, in thinking, the immaterial universal is used by the material human. It is clear that
we do make use of universals; this is necessary for such human rational tasks as doing
philosophy or using abstract concepts. Yet, Thomas must posit divine illumination—
divine intervention of a sort that allows for linking the physical and nonphysical
worlds—to deal with this issue. Divine illumination cannot be accounted for physically;
the very role it plays in Thomistic philosophy is to bridge this gap.
Causal closure is potentially devastating for Thomistic philosophy, because it
claims the physical realm is sufficient for explaining any physical effect. As such, mental
causes cannot have physical effects. Therefore, the soul cannot affect behavior, and
Thomas’s account of the relation between the incorporeal and corporeal worlds cannot
account for the transmission of universals.
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The intellect must supervene on brain states if the intellect is going to account for
any effect in the physical world, as is clear from Papineau’s argument which states the
completeness of physics coupled with causal influence and the absence of universal
overdetermination requires the reader to accept the identity of the mental with the
physical.
“Premise 1 (the completeness of physics):
All physical effects are fully determined by law by prior physical
occurrences.
Premise 2 (causal influence):
All mental occurrences have physical effects.
Premise 3 (no universal overdetermination):
The physical effects of mental causes are not all overdetermined.
Conclusion:
Mental occurrences must be identical with physical occurrences.”95

It is unlikely that Thomas would be willing to accept that mental events cannot cause
physical events and can only be posited outside the physical realm, considering his
conviction that the soul is the first act of the body. As the first act of the body, the soul is
the vital function of a human being. If the definition of the soul is the actualization of a
physical potentiality, then it seems that the soul is essentially the manifestation of the link
between the incorporeal and corporeal. At least, the human capacity to recognize
universals requires bridging the material and immaterial worlds, in this case something
immaterial (universal) causing a physical effect (human behavior).
Additionally, Thomas admits that the unembodied soul is crippled by its lack of a
material organ with which to act. Again, Thomas describes the soul as the act of the
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body. With no body, there can be no action. The soul informs the body and allows its
function; thus, without said body, no function would be possible: a hardship for his
theory.
The only other option offered by causal closure is that physical effects are
overdetermined by mental effects, but Thomas cannot accept this conclusion because he
refuses to allow the dependence of the intellect upon any corporeal body. That is, he
cannot identify the universalizing capacity with any organ, as it belongs to the soul alone.
Thus, if mental events do not have causal power (as is required by causal closure), he is
forced to conclude that the mind is at least reliant on, if not identified with, the brain, or
parts of it. Aquinas cannot accept that the mind is reliant on the brain, however, because
if it were, it would not be able to function at all when separated from the body after death.
And, while he maintains that the separated soul is somewhat diminished in its capacities,
he claims it is still able to perform some of the essential functions of understanding, if
that understanding is “confused and general,” and of universals only.96
Thomas could maintain non-causal incorporeal realms, but (according to
physicalism and according to his account) humans could not have knowledge of them
except by introspection. The theologian accepts that “the intellective soul does cognize
all true things in the eternal reasons,” and maintains that humans are able to recognize
truth when exposed to it, but cannot account for how this would happen in the incorporeal
realm, because he rejects innate knowledge.97 Aquinas has to rely on God’s light (which
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he believes is provided internally from the beginning of human life, not ongoing) for
knowledge of universals.98 Furthermore, in any case, these mental occurrences would not
be causal and would not affect behavior.99 Yet, of course, Thomas is committed to
nonphysical causes (philosophical ideas) having physical effects (humans
philosophizing). His reliance on divine illumination is just the weak link of his argument,
broken by causal closure.
Attempts have been made to discredit causal closure by questioning exactly what
is meant by “physics” and concluding that the definition of this term is either meaningless
or entails less than physicalists maintain. Defining physics or the physical is difficult.
However, what is included in the physical can be described narrowly and preserve the
conclusion of the causal argument. That is, the physical can be defined as “the same
general kind as are recognized by current physical theory” or simply be described as
microscopic (that is, “composed of entities below a certain size”), non-mental or nonbiological, and preserve causal closure.100
Thomas, were he alive today and aware of quantum mechanics, might at this point
argue that mental properties are emergent, and that these emergent properties have causal
powers by virtue of downward causation.101 Emergent properties are often described as
novel properties that “emerge” from parts of a whole and the way those parts are put
together, but which are not explicable by the parts themselves. That is, an object may
98
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have a property or a power that the parts of that object cannot or do not fully explain,
which are not predictable from the sum of those parts.102 This implies that it is possible
for mental properties to have causal powers that cannot be explained fully by the causes
of the physical brain. In this case, causation moves from the macro level to the micro.
However, it entails that either there are mental causes for physical effects (which boils
down to substance dualism and its attendant interaction problem), or that these effects are
caused by the physical (and that related mental phenomena are non-causal), which is
effectively epiphenomenalism.103
Furthermore, quantum mechanics cannot be seen as providing space for mental
causes via downward influence, for while the indeterminism of modern quantum
mechanics states that certain physical effects are statistical, rather than deterministic, and
have no sufficient determining cause, those random physical effects have their
probabilities fixed by sufficient immediate physical causes. So, if causal closure includes
the physical determination of physical probabilities, then causal closure is safe.104
In effect, causal closure requires either type identity of non-physical properties
with physical properties of a physical cause, or it requires supervenience of non-physical
properties onto physical properties. Thus, the evidence for the completeness of physics
demands that the mind is constituted by the brain, which appears to exclude Thomistic
dualism. Thomas’s philosophy cannot withstand causal closure, especially because his
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account of knowledge hinges on divine illumination, which does not explain the
transmission of universals from the incorporeal realm to the corporeal brain.

V. Conclusion
This thesis has explicated the connection, for Thomas Aquinas, of psychology and
the afterlife. The resurrection of the body, as required by Christian doctrine, provides the
philosopher with an opportunity to highlight the benefits of his philosophy of mind.
Aquinas properly elucidates the interaction of soul and body by redefining the human;
however, in doing so, he creates a new problem, that of how the soul survives the death
of the body.
Aquinas, adhering to Christian doctrine, maintains physical and spiritual reward
and punishment after death. By accepting the essentiality of both body and soul, he
allows for a heaven and hell described in scripture and church dogma. Thomas must
depend upon physical resurrection to account for the Christian afterlife, and does not give
a clear answer to the question of how the human soul survives in the intervening state
between human death and resurrection.
Ultimately, I have provided criticisms of Thomas Aquinas that question his
account of universals by applying contemporary understandings of physics as well as on
his traditional natural philosophy. Thus, the philosopher fails to explain the mind-body
connection in a way that allows for the separability of soul from matter, an immaterial
afterlife, and accounts for the interaction of material and immaterial things.
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